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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ROBERT LYNN HANSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 44066
Ada County Case No.
CR-2004-1253

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Hanson failed to show error in the district court’s denial of his motion to
correct credit for time served?

Hanson Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Denial Of His Motion To
Correct Credit For Time Served
In 2004, a grand jury indicted Hanson on three counts of sexual abuse of a child
under the age of 16 years and two counts of failure to report abuse. (R., pp.6-8.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Hanson pled guilty to one count of sexual abuse of a
child under the age of 16 years, and the state dismissed the remaining charges. (R.,
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pp.54-55.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of 15 years, with three years
fixed, and retained jurisdiction.

(R., pp.70-73.)

Following the period of retained

jurisdiction, the district court relinquished jurisdiction and granted Hanson 454 days of
credit for time served. (R., pp.77-79.) Hanson filed a timely Rule 35 motion for a
reduction of sentence, which the district court denied. (R., pp.85-88, 98-100.)
More than nine years later, Hanson filed a “Motion for Correction of Sentence Per
ICR 35(c),” claiming that the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) “incorrectly
calculated” the “full term expiration” date of his sentence when applying his 454 days of
credit for time served. (R., pp.102-04.) The district court denied the motion, noting that
Hanson was not challenging the court’s calculation of 454 days of credit for prejudgment
time served, and that it did not have jurisdiction to correct decisions made by IDOC with
respect to whether to award Hanson credit for time served while he was on parole. (R.,
pp.106-08.) Hanson filed a notice of appeal timely only from the district court’s order
denying his motion to correct credit for time served. (R., pp.109-11.)
Hanson asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to correct credit
for time served because, he claims, IDOC incorrectly calculated the full term expiration
date of his sentence when it applied his 454 days of credit for time served. (Appellant’s
brief, pp.1-2.) Hanson has failed to show error in the district court’s denial of his motion
to correct credit for time served.
“A motion to correct a court’s computation of credit for time served, granted
pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 18-309 or 19-2603, may be made at any time.” I.C.R.
35(c) (emphasis added). Pursuant to I.C. § 18-309:
In computing the term of imprisonment, the person against whom
the judgment was entered shall receive credit in the judgment for any
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period of incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such incarceration was
for the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered.
The remainder of the term commences upon the pronouncement of
sentence and if thereafter, during such term, the defendant by any legal
means is temporarily released from such imprisonment and subsequently
returned thereto, the time during which he was at large must not be
computed as part of such term.
I.C. § 18-309(1) (emphasis added).
In its order denying Hanson’s motion to correct IDOC’s calculation of the full term
expiration date of Hanson’s sentence, the district court properly determined that its
jurisdiction under Rule 35(c) “is limited to correcting the Court’s own computation of
credit for time served” and that “Hanson has not argued, much less shown, that the
Court’s own computation is incorrect.” (R., p.107.) The district court continued:
Moreover, the Court is able to discern from the records attached to
the motion [see R., p.104] that the Department has not failed to give effect
to the Court’s award of 454 days of credit for prejudgment incarceration.
The difference between the full term expiration date as calculated by the
Department and as calculated by Hanson is almost entirely accounted for
by an evident parole commission decision that 116 days of the time
Hanson spent on parole should not be counted against his prison
sentence. That decision is within the parole commission’s authority, see
I.C. § 20-228, and the Court lacks authority to override it.
(R., p.107.)

Indeed, the Idaho Department of Correction Official Time Calculation

Report – submitted by Hanson in support of his motion to correct credit for time served
– indicates that, following his commitment to IDOC, Hanson was paroled on at least one
occasion, and that his parole was later revoked. (R., p.104.) As stated by the district
court, I.C. § 20-228 authorizes the parole commission to exercise discretion to credit
time spent on parole when calculating the remaining period of confinement after parole
is revoked. Specifically, I.C. § 20-228 provides: “Such person so recommitted … must
serve out the sentence, and the time during which such prisoner was out on parole shall
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not be deemed a part thereof, unless the commission, in its discretion, shall determine
otherwise... .” Nothing in the record rebuts the presumption that the Commission, in the
exercise of its statutory discretion, determined that Hanson was not entitled to credit for
the time he spent on parole prior to being recommitted. A motion to correct credit for
time served is not the proper mechanism for addressing IDOC’s calculation of the full
term expiration date of Hanson’s sentence, particularly where, as here, Hanson is not
challenging the amount of credit for time served (prejudgment) that the district court
awarded him. Rather, a petition for writ of habeas corpus is an appropriate mechanism
for challenging an alleged impropriety or error in the Department's computation of a
prisoner's sentence. Mickelsen v. Idaho State Correctional Instn., 131 Idaho 352, 355,
955 P.2d 1131, 1134 (Ct. App. 1998).
Because the district court did not have the authority to alter computations made
by IDOC, or to grant Hanson credit for time he served on parole after he was committed
to IDOC custody, the court did not err by denying Hanson’s motion to correct the
Department’s calculation of the full term expiration date of Hanson’s sentence. As such,
Hanson has failed to establish error in the district court’s denial of his motion to correct
credit for time served and the court’s order denying the motion should be affirmed.
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Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order
denying Hanson’s motion to correct credit for time served.
DATED this 3rd day of August, 2016.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming__________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal
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